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Abstract
We develop a model of the interacting markets for online content and oﬄine products. We
portray content providers and the search engine as competing platforms that intermediate in the
product market (a horizontal relation), while also vertically related in the content market. Explicitly
modeling both markets allows us to characterize the substitutability (and manipulability) of search
and display advertising, and its effect on the incentives to distort organic search results as well as
spillovers on the reliability of sponsored search results. Specifically, improvements in the technology
for targeting display ads increases this substitutability and the threat of organic search distortions.
Integration of the search engine that results in full monopolization of the display ad market improves
search reliability and raises consumer and total welfare, if content providers are similar. However,
partial integration, or full integration when content providers differ in their ad effectiveness, introduce
additional incentives for distortion and may reduce consumer and total welfare.
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“[W]e expect that advertising funded search engines will be
inherently biased towards the advertisers and away from
the needs of the consumers.” - Brin and Page (1998)
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the strategic interaction of a dominant search engine, which we denote by G,
with online content providers and other internet agents. We characterize G’s incentives as a traffic
manager, and analyze how these incentives and welfare outcomes change when G expands into content
provision and ad intermediation.1
Our research starts by explicitly modeling a search engine as a platform that intermediates two
different but interacting markets. The search engine helps consumers match with providers in the
market for online content (e.g., news, entertainment, dictionaries). Also, it helps consumers match with
sellers in the market for oﬄine products (e.g., apparel, electronics, holiday packages). These markets
are not independent. The key interdependence is that content providers, which we call publishers, are
not only customers of the search engine in the market for online content, but also competing platforms
in the market for oﬄine products. Concretely, sellers of oﬄine products, which we call merchants, can
reach consumers on G’s search results page (via sponsored search links) or on publishers’ content pages
(via display ads). Therefore, when G manages traffic in the market for online content, it does also affect
the traffic to competing platforms in the market for oﬄine products.
We propose a stylized model of these two markets and their interaction. Consumers decide whether
to use G, and those who do, enter queries for both oﬄine products and online content.2 G answers
the queries with (paid-for) sponsored and (non-paid-for) organic results. G chooses the reliability of
both these types of result, possibly biasing them in the sense of distorting away from what is optimal
for consumers. In the model, consumers click on sponsored results when seeking products and click on
organic results when seeking content.3 While consumers always need G to find relevant content, they
may find products via display advertising on publishers’ content websites instead of via G.
Figure 1 depicts the two interacting markets, with dashed arrows for content and solid arrows for
products. The downward arrows indicate a consumer visiting the two-sided platforms (shown as boxes)
of G and publishers, and the upward arrows depict providers (shown as triangles) successfully posting
links on these platforms. In particular, the merchant shown can reach the consumer by posting a
1With market shares exceeding 90% in most European countries and a global average above 80%, Google arguably
dominates online search in most of the world (State-of-search, 2012). Google has recently expanded into ad intermediation
(AdSense and AdWords) and content provision (e.g., Google Finance, YouTube and Zagat). Although search engines may
be “just one click away” as is often argued, indirect network externalities, combined with small switching costs, habit
effects and delays in detecting reduced search quality, interfere with competitive forces.
2In Broder’s (2002) taxonomy, these correspond, respectively, to “informational” and “transactional” searches.
3We will argue that this separation is empirically founded. We also offer sufficient conditions. While highly stylized,
this keeps the model simple and helps highlight how the two markets interact.
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sponsored search link on G but also by posting a display ad on the publisher shown; this illustrates the
substitutability of the search and display ad channels.
Figure 1: The two interacting markets
The interdependence of these two markets makes G and the publishers both vertically and horizon-
tally related. By increasing the reliability of its results, G increases consumer participation, which also
benefits publishers (a vertical externality). However, increasing the reliability of organic results also
raises the effectiveness of display advertising on publisher platforms at the expense of sponsored search
advertising on G’s search platform (a horizontal externality). So G has an incentive to instead distort
organic search towards publishers that are less effective for display advertising, whether intrinsically, by
choice (as for Wikipedia which carries no ads), or by poor match (consumers tend to spend less time
on less relevant publishers’ webs, exposing them less to display ads).4
Thus, G’s incentives to bias organic search lie in the substitutability between G’s (sponsored) search
ads and publishers’ display ads. We characterize this substitutability, identifying the role of technologies
for targeting merchants’ display ads to publishers’ content.5
G’s incentives to bias sponsored search lie in a potential conflict of interest between consumers and
merchants over ranking sponsored links: the merchants most willing to pay for a top position are not
the best option for consumers whenever net margins and net consumer values are not aligned. In our
model, merchants buy (search) ads from G and (display) ads from publishers, with all prices set by
auction. G’s resulting share of merchant profits gives it an incentive to sell its search ads to high margin
merchants by underweighting merchants’ relevance or value to consumers in the scoring auction for G’s
sponsored links.
4In line with this, Google AdSense recommend that publishers seek relevant consumers as a way to raise their display
ad revenues, for a given content quality. For direct empirical support, see the growing body of eye-tracking-based search
studies; e.g., Lorigo et al., (2008) and in particular, Wanga and Day (2007). Ellman and Germano (2009) and Wilbur
(2008) offer further evidence and richer views on the relationship between content and advertising effectiveness.
5Substitutability lies at the heart of regulatory debates (see FTC 071-0170 and the contrasting EU report, M.4731).
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Tempered by the need to attract consumers to search on G, these incentives to bias organic and
sponsored search, interact as imperfect substitutes for G. By explicitly modeling both markets, we are
able to conduct comparative statics to predict how the two search reliabilities respond to market charac-
teristics and shifts in technological parameters. Thus we find that sponsored search results worsen but
organic search improves when the conflict of interest between consumers and merchants rises. Mean-
while, fixing the conflict of interest and increasing the relative profitability of the oﬄine product market
worsens organic search reliability and improves sponsored search. Also importantly, the improvements
in display ad targeting that have been enabled by recent technological innovations, increase the sub-
stitutability of display and sponsored advertising, which induces G to offer less reliable organic search
results but more reliable sponsored search results.
Having characterized G’s incentives in the two markets, we study the effects of G’s integrations
with publishers and ad intermediaries. Integration induces G to, at least partially, internalize both
horizontal and vertical externalities. First, with symmetric publishers, integration that fully monopolizes
ad intermediation or publishing improves the reliability of G’s search results, because G fully internalizes
profits from display advertising. As usual, the internalization of the vertical externality on publishers
increases G’s value of total demand (consumer participation), which here requires more reliable search
results. Usually internalization of the horizontal externality points in the opposite direction, but here
it complements the vertical internalization in raising total demand. This is because a non-integrated
G “steals” business from publishers, not by lowering price, but by distorting organic search to make
publishers’ display ads less effective; eliminating business-stealing therefore raises search reliability and
raises consumer participation.
Second, integrations involving only a fraction of publishers bias G’s organic search in favor of G-
owned or G-affiliated publishers. Such partial integrations actually raise G’s incentives to steal business
from independent publishers. We identify conditions under which this effect dominates the effect dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph, and so partial integration results in lower total welfare and lower
consumer surplus than non-integration.
Third, even integrations involving all publishers (full monopolization) can have negative conse-
quences for consumer and total surplus when publishers are asymmetric. Specifically, when publishers
vary in their effectiveness as platforms for display advertising, integration creates an incentive for G to
divert traffic from less to more effective publishers. This incentive is stronger than the converse incen-
tive (to divert traffic from more to less effective publishers) under non-integration. Again, we identify
conditions under which the net effect of integration is lower consumer and total welfare.
An additional effect of integration into ad-intermediation is a reduction in publisher rents. As a
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result, integration may have an adverse effect on the quality of publishers’ content.6
Summarizing, our contribution is to develop a model of the interacting markets for online content
and oﬄine products. We portray publishers and the search engine as competing platforms that interme-
diate in the product market (a horizontal relation), while also vertically related in the content market.
Explicitly modeling both markets allows us to characterize the substitutability (and manipulability) of
search and display advertising. This, in turn, allows us to explore G’s incentives to distort organic and
sponsored search results, and to analyze how market and technology characteristics affect these incen-
tives. In particular, we show that improvements in the technology for targeting display ads increase this
substitutability and with it, the risk of organic search distortion. Regarding integration into content
provision (publishing) and ad intermediation, we show that the consequences for search reliability and
consumer and total welfare depend critically on publisher heterogeneity (in display ad effectiveness),
and on the fraction of publishers that become owned by or affiliated with the search engine.
Our analysis relates to work on platform competition with multi-homing consumers and gatekeeping,
as well as work on organic and sponsored search. A novel feature compared to recent studies of multi-
homing,7 is that one platform (the search engine) is a gatekeeper whose control over links to publishers
affects the degree of multi-homing.8
A number of recent papers study either organic or sponsored search. White (2013) presents the
insight that a non-integrated search engine may bias organic search to reduce downstream merchant
competition and thereby extract higher rents from sponsored search, but he does not model the content
search nor the publisher platforms that compete for merchants’ ad custom.9 White and Jain (2012)
postulate reduced-form ad revenues and introduce ad-nuisance effects in a model where search engine
and publishers are complements. Thus, coordination between platforms allows them to internalize the
vertical externality, as in our model. Even if we interpreted ad-nuisance as a metaphor for advertising
competition, horizontal externalities would be absent from their paper. Also, in independent research,
de Cornière and Taylor (2013) study search bias and integration. They model search for content but,
as in White and Jain (2012), they use a reduced-form approach without search for products and with
ad-nuisance. Instead of complementarity between platforms, they assume exogenous substitutability
between advertising on G’s and publishers’ websites, which motivates an organic search bias. They also
study the impact of integration with one of two asymmetric publishers under this assumption.
By instead explicitly considering micro-foundations of both the market for content and the mar-
ket for products, we can endogenize substitutability between display ads and sponsored ads, and also
6This is of particular concern for ad-financed independent journalism on the internet.
7See e.g., Athey et al., (2013), Anderson et al., (2013), Ambrus et al., (2013), White and Jain (2012).
8Baye and Morgan’s (2001) early model captures an internet gatekeeper controlling links to merchants but has no
competing platforms.
9In White (2013), merchants cannot choose between display and search advertising; the focus is on downstream pricing.
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substitutability between organic and sponsored distortions from the engine’s point of view. Moreover,
this permits comparative statics exercises, including the effect of market conditions and technological
parameters on these substitutabilities.
One element of our model is the potential existence of a conflict of interest in the product market.
The auction literature on product search has focused on this issue and the role of the mechanisms used
to allocate sponsored links. Early work characterized generalized second-price position auctions and
investigated auction design.10 Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) show how search
auctions generate advantageous selection of those privately-informed merchants most attractive to con-
sumers; essentially, consumers seek merchants that will attract them to click-through and buy. In some
of these studies, conflicts of interest arise from private information of merchants about their value per
click (e.g., in Athey and Ellison, 2011, engines distort rankings to extract merchants’ rent) or to private
consumer ability to evaluate product relevance (as in Athey and Ellison, 2011, or Hagiu and Jullien,
2011, where engines distort results to induce consumers to search more, generating a positive externality
on merchants). In other studies, engines distort search to relax downstream product market competi-
tion, thereby raising merchants’ value of advertising (see e.g., Chen and He, 2011, Eliaz and Spiegler,
2011, Hagiu and Jullien, 2011, White, 2013, Xu et al., 2010 and 2011).
Xu et al., (2012) and Taylor (2013) consider a model with only product search, and focus on the fact
that reliable organic results constitute “self-cannibalization” by G, since organic links give merchants
a free substitute to sponsoring links on G. This is also present in our model. In fact, removing the
unexplained restrictions considered in these papers, organic results become superfluous.11
Search bias is not so easy to detect, but Tarantino (2013) and especially Edelman and Lai (2013)
provide convincing empirical evidence of bias of Google towards integrated publishers and merchants.12
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model and characterizes the
social optimum, before analyzing the equilibrium of the game with full separation in section 3, with
monopolizing integration into ad intermediation in section 4, and partial monopolization in section 5.
In section 6, we allow for publisher asymmetries in ad effectiveness and section 7 treats integration with
publishers. In all cases, we analyze welfare and surplus implications. Section 8 discusses assumptions
and extensions and we conclude in section 9, gathering proofs in the Appendix.
10See e.g., Lehaie (2006), Edelman et al., (2007), Varian (2007), Börgers et al., (2007), and on design, Edelman and
Schwarz (2010), Liu et al., (2010) and Athey and Ellison (2011). Paid-for prominence (Armstrong and Zhou, 2011) and
paid-for priority (Choi and Kim, 2010) are also related.
11In Xu et al., (2012), consumer clicks on organic and sponsored links are independent of link reliabilities. In Taylor
(2013), search engines suboptimally offer only one sponsored link, and sponsored results implicitly cannot use information
used in organic results.
12Tarantino (2013) adds the point that a general search engine integrated into vertical search would divert traffic towards
its vertical search engines, which he models as merchants (travel intermediaries often sell travel products), omitting the
2-sided platform aspect.
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2 The baseline model
We first present the essential elements of the baseline model, justifying the key assumptions at the
end of the section; section 8 discusses further extensions. We start by describing the two markets, for
online content and for oﬄine products; next, we present the two types of platforms that operate in these
markets. We then explain the different platforms’ pricing rules, followed by the timing of decisions.
Online content and oﬄine products. A mass one of consumers, indexed by i, value specific
varieties of online goods, called “content”, available on publishers’ websites, and produced at zero cost.
Each of N publishers has exactly one website with unique content, so publishers, content and websites
share an index, n. Each consumer i has a favorite or “best-match” content, n (i), that generates net
utility, u > 0, while any other content, n 6= n (i), generates zero net utility and further units imply a net
loss. Consumers do not know the identity of the publishers offering their preferred content and require
the help of the search engine.
Each consumer also has a unit demand for oﬄine goods, called “products.” Products vary by category
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} and type k ∈ {1, 2}, giving 2J products defined by pairs (j, k). Consumer i only
values one category, denoted j (i), with one unit of product (j (i) , k) giving i a net benefit vk where
0 < v2 < v1; so (j (i) , 1) and (j (i) , 2) are i’s “best-match” and “second-best” products, respectively.
All other products or additional units imply a net loss. As with content, consumers do not know the
identity of the merchants offering their preferred oﬄine goods.
Merchants each sell one product, which they make available on their websites. We call a merchant
type k if its product is type k; such merchants earn a unit margin mk. Two merchants produce each
product, implying 4J merchants and ensuring competition for all advertising opportunities.13
We treat the symmetric case where each product category and each publisher’s content interests the
same fraction of consumers, 1J and
1
N , respectively.
Platforms. G intermediates the market for content. Consumers, being unaware of the identity
of their preferred publisher, must turn to G to facilitate their search. They type in a query describing
their desired content. G can perfectly interpret each query and identify the relevant publisher, n(i). G
responds by providing a single link to a publisher’s website. For now, we assume this link is organic
(non-paid for) and leads to some publisher’s content. G may or may not provide the link to the
consumer’s favorite content. In particular, with some probability, denoted rO, the link leads to the site
of the consumer’s best-match publisher, n(i), and otherwise to some other publisher’s site. G chooses
rO ∈ [0, 1].
G also intermediates the product market. Consumer i may conduct a product search in G by typing
13This competition is not critical but simplifies the analysis as it implies zero merchant profits in equilibrium.
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in a query describing i’s favorite product category, which G can interpret perfectly. G can also identify
the four relevant merchants producing goods in category j(i) and their types. G answers with a single
sponsored result and no (relevant) organic result. We again rationalize this behavior below. G uses a
weighted second-price auction to allocate the single sponsored result, as described in detail shortly.
Unlike in the content market (where only G intermediates), in the product market, publishers
offer additional intermediating platforms. Each publisher n offers one “display ad” slot for a link to a
merchant’s website, whenever a consumer i visits n’s website to consume its content and i notices the
ad with probability α ∈ (0, 1] if i is visiting her best-match publisher n (i) and probability αβ if i is
on any other publisher’s web, where β < 1.14 Display ad targeting is less accurate than for search ads
(which are informed by consumer queries). Publishers, aided by ad intermediary targeting technologies,
only observe a signal s (i) ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} of each visiting consumer’s product category interest. This
signal correctly indicates i’s preferred product category with probability σ: formally, s (i) = j(i), with
probability σ and otherwise points to a random distinct category.15
Summarizing, as shown in Figure 1, publishers provide online content to consumers but they are
also platforms that bring together consumers and merchants. At the same time, the search engine is a
platform that intermediates in both markets. By responding to content queries, G is the only platform
for matching consumers with content publishers, which are themselves match-makers in the market for
oﬄine products. By responding to product queries, G directly matches consumers and merchants.
Auctions for ads. When a consumer i enters a query for a product in G’s website, all merchants
“observe” the query and bid for the sponsored link. Bidding determines the “pay per click” price, denoted
“PPC”. G neglects any bid by merchants selling products in category j 6= j (i), and partially discounts
the bids of merchants selling product (j (i) , 2) by a factor µ ≤ 1, which is an endogenous variable selected
by G. The winner of the auction is determined by comparing the weighted bids.16 The PPC rate is set
equal to the second highest bid. In case of a tie, if the set of winners include both types of bidders, then
G selects a type 1 merchant with probability rS and a type 2 merchant with probability 1− rS . Also G
always assigns equal probabilities to any tying merchants of the same type. In equilibrium, merchants
of the same type submit the same bid. Moreover, we will see that G chooses µ so that the types always
tie (the four relevant merchants tie in each auction). Hence, rS represents the “reliability” of sponsored
search results just as rO represents the “reliability” of organic results.
Publishers also auction the ad space on their websites for each consumer visit using a standard
second price auction (a weighted auction offers them no advantage). That is, they conduct an auction
14Typically, α < 1 since display links must distract consumers from the publisher’s content to generate click-through.
15Targeting precision satisfies 1
J
≤ σ ≤ 1 since σ = 1
J
if the ad intermediary has no information on consumer preferences
and σ = 1 if it can identify the consumer’s best-match category with probability one. n (i) and s (i) are independent.
16Let bmaxk denote the maximum bid of merchants offering product (j (i) , k). If b
max
1 > µb
max
2 , a type 1 merchant wins.
Conversely, if bmax1 < µbmax2 , a type 2 merchant wins.
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for the PPC for displaying an ad, contingent on the signal s (i) of the consumer’s preferred product
category.17 Merchants submit bids and the publisher displays one highest bidding merchant’s ad to this
consumer. Publishers have no costs except possible charges for ad intermediation, which we can ignore
for the time being.18
Consumer search. We model consumers’ participation in using G’s search engine as a single
decision that depends on the overall reliability of sponsored and organic results. Each consumer i has a
joint cost ci of using the search engine for both content and product queries; this includes the foregone
expected benefits from alternative search. We assume that ci is an independent draw from a continuous
random variable on [0, cH ] with density function f (c) and cumulative distribution function F (c), such
that the reverse hazard rate, H (c) = f(c)F (c) , is decreasing.
19 Each consumer observes her cost ci privately
and prior to deciding participation. Gross of her direct plus opportunity costs given by ci, i’s expected
gain from participating in online search is the sum of expected gains from consuming online content
plus oﬄine products, found via a display ad during content search or via a search ad during product
search. The highest possible such gain is u+v1. We assume cH > u+v1 so that consumer participation
in online search is interior in any equilibrium.
Conflict of interest. Intuitively, the interests of consumers and merchants could be aligned for
some products but misaligned for others. That is, m1 could be higher than m2, whence, given v1 > v2,
the type of goods preferred by consumers would also be the type that generates the highest profits.
But as we justify below, consumers and merchants’ interests may also be misaligned: m1 < m2. In
general, interests will be misaligned for some fraction of searches (some fraction of product categories).
All we need is that this fraction is non-zero, but for simplicity we assume the fraction is one, that is,
m1 < m2; nothing qualitative is affected. Moreover, to simplify the welfare analysis, we focus on the
case m1 + v1 > m2 + v2, so the social optimum has only type 1 transactions.
The timing. In the first stage, G announces its auction rules, including design variables, µ, rS
and rO, and publishers announce their auctions. In the second stage, merchants choose their bidding
strategies for both search and display advertising auctions. In the third stage, consumers decide whether
or not to use the search engine. If they do participate in search on G, they type in their query for content
and can visit the website of the publisher that appears in the organic search results. While consuming
the publisher’s online content, they may be attracted to click on its displayed ad through to a merchant’s
web where they may buy the merchant’s product. Then, they either leave the market or they type in
17Rather than reveal their signals to merchants in real-time, publishers and G in its search auctions, make their
information available for interaction with merchants’ bidding strategies in automated auctions. But it is equivalent
to describe as if merchants bid after observing the information.
18These charges are zero in the case without integration, because intermediaries have zero costs and we assume Bertrand
competition. So we need only model ad intermediaries explicitly when the search engine owns one.
19This ensures that G faces an increasing ‘marginal factor cost’ of attracting the consumer base it “sells” on to merchants.
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a product query and can visit the website of the merchant that appears in the sponsored search result
and can then buy that merchant’s product. Merchants, publishers, and consumers always observe the
outcomes of previous stages.
None of our results depend on consumers always conducting their searches in this exact order (first
content and then product). All we need is that a positive fraction of consumers buy from merchants
that they find via publishers’ display ads, thereby reducing their need for G in the product market.
2.1 Discussion
We now show how several features of the model that might appear simplistic or far-fetched are actually
equivalent to richer and more realistic representations.
Search results. We have assumed that G provides exclusively organic results for content queries
and sponsored results for product queries. While clearly extreme, this split is consistent with empirical
studies finding that people use sponsored links more than organic results when conducting product
searches or “e-commerce search queries” (Greenspan, 2004, Jansen, 2007), but place more trust in
organic results when seeking content (Hotchkiss et al., 2005, Jansen and Resnick, 2006).
In terms of the logic of the model, it is very intuitive that, in the case of product queries, merchants
are willing to pay to appear prominently in the list of the search engine’s results. Also, it is in G’s interest
to withhold useful organic links in order to avoid cannibalization, as we explain in the introduction.
Clearly, nothing changes in our model if G offers organic results that could be valuable for consumers
but that are dominated by sponsored results, since consumers will never click on them.20
In the case of content queries, in principle nothing in our model would prevent publishers from
participating in position auctions. In the real world, they seem not to do so. Multiple factors may
explain this behavior. A full explanation goes beyond the scope of this paper, but we mention two
reasons. One is that publishers may have negligible willingness to pay on each individual query, owing to
transaction costs. Having to constantly adapt bidding strategies, over a myriad of potentially relevant
keywords, to changes in content and query patterns could be very costly for publishers with highly
dynamic content, such as news websites. This dissuades publishers from bidding. Another possible
reason has to do with the informational nature of publishers’ content, which makes observability and
therefore reputation-building particularly difficult. In some cases, publishers may attempt to build
20In fact, in our model, G suffers no loss if the link to the winner of the position auction is displayed twice, once marked
as an sponsored result and the second time marked as an organic result. Consumers would then be indifferent and would
presumably click on the organic result with some probability γ. Merchants would not pay directly when their organic
results are clicked, but their willingness to pay for a sponsored click would be multiplied by 1
γ
. G would still need to
suppress organic links to merchants that do not bid on G’s sponsored auctions (some merchants have accused G of this
but we are not aware of any proven evidence). All our results would remain unchanged. Yang and Ghose (2010) and Blake
et al. (2013) provide mixed field study evidence on whether Google actually removes organic links to merchants that stop
bidding for sponsored slots, based on experiments in which merchants stopped bidding in position auctions; note that the
latter paper studies Ebay and may be explained by the reputation discussion below.
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a reputation for providing reliable content by minimizing the visibility of their commercial interests.
Bidding on sponsored links to expand their audiences may hurt their reputation by making their profit
motive more salient.
We have assumed that G offers a single result, both for content and product searches. Within the
model this is in fact optimal since G knows all the relevant information about consumers’ needs, and
consumers have a unit demand for both online and oﬄine goods. In reality, most searches generate
multiple results, which makes sense for consumers seeking multiple goods, but only if some of the goods
demanded are sufficiently similar for a single query to identify them together. A more important reason
for multiple results is that queries are often ambiguous and consumers retain private information or
ability to evaluate results.
Joint participation constraint. We model consumer search participation as a single decision, for
both product and content searches. This simplification captures the fact that high quality results in
either type of search tend to spill over into improving G’s overall popularity or reputation as a reliable
search engine. One explanation for this spillover is that consumers tend to develop a habit of using a
fixed engine, rather than adapting each search to the specific search need of the moment. An independent
but complementary explanation builds on observability. Consumers tend to learn about the quality of
search from friends, from media reports and from their own experience. Such learning tends to be coarse,
rather than fully contingent on each type of search, because communication is limited and memory and
aggregative skills may be limited too. In this context, even if consumers take independent participation
decisions in content and product searches, if G changes the reliability of one type of result (say, organic)
this would affect its overall reputation, and hence affect consumer participation in product, as well as
content searches. Modeling consumer participation as a single decision captures such spillovers in a
simple and tractable fashion.
Conflict of interest. We are assuming that consumers’ and merchants’ always conflict, but as
already discussed, we only need that they sometimes conflict. A simple example of such conflict arises
when all merchants have the same cost and consumers gain the same gross (of price) utility from either
relevant merchant’s product, but the two types of products differ in price. Price differences can arise
endogenously, remaining orthogonal to the online search for products, if merchants also sell to local
markets of oﬄine consumers whose elasticities differ and if regulatory or reputational concerns prevent
merchants from price discriminating between online and oﬄine consumers.
The scoring auction. The weighted position auction for determining PPCs seeks to capture, in a
simplified framework, the mechanism that Google claims to use in reality.21 The outcome of the auction
depends not only on merchants’ bids but also on their quality scores, which capture the relevance of
21See Hal Varian’s Youtube video on Google’s scoring auctions, or Varian (2007).
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merchant products to consumer demands, as inferred from queries, as well as factors such as website
quality. In so doing, Google recognizes the possibility of conflicting interests between consumers and
merchants that we have described. Consumers would like G to position the producers of the type 1
good as the top sponsored result, but the producers of the type 2 good have a higher willingness to pay
for this slot. The choice of µ and rS reflects G’s compromise between these two objectives. Google’s
claims would suggest that rS = 1, with µ purely serving to prevent type 2 merchants from winning, but
our theory and Brin and Page’s (1998) early remarks suggest that this may not be the case.
Reputation and commitment. In the model, G sets µ, rS and rO and then consumers observe this
before deciding whether or not to participate. Implicitly, this assumes that G can commit perfectly to
any distortion strategy, or reliabilities rO and rS , that it wishes to adopt. The commitment assumption
captures in a static model the idea that, over time, G can build a reputation for reliable search results.
A key constraint on reputation building is the difficulty consumers have in observing reliability. Perfect
observability requires consumers to know the quality of the results that G could have provided, as well
as seeing those it actually provides. This extreme case is implausible, but consumers can certainly
evaluate their own experiences and may learn from each others’ experiences. So, commitment is feasible
indirectly through reputation. As discussed above, this reputation and social learning interpretation
can justify the consumer joint participation assumption and the role of organic results.22
2.2 The social planner’s problem
Before analyzing the model, we describe the benchmark optimal outcome for a social planner who cares
about the sum of all agents’ surpluses and can control how the search engine matches consumers with
merchants and publishers, how publishers allocate display ads among merchants, and which consumers
participate in online search. For any given participation level, the best possible outcome from this total
surplus perspective is for each consumer to consume her best-match content and one unit of her best-
match product; recall m1 + v1 > m2 + v2. This is feasible: G can send each consumer to the best-match
publisher, n (i), and can send any product-searching consumer to a best-match merchant, that is, one
producing (j (i) , 1). This is also necessary for efficiency. First, content search must be undistorted
since consumers have no alternative way to find content. Second, product search must be undistorted,
because the alternative channel, display advertising, at best permits consumers to find their best-match
products with probability σα < 1.23 Abusing notation in anticipation of the equilibria where merchant
22Even naïve consumers would detect bias if G’s organic results on a product search were empty or entirely useless, or
suppress obviously relevant merchants (such as Ebay on a search query for “Ebay camera”). Similarly, regulators may be
able to punish such blatant forms of bias. Indeed, recent FTC and EU investigations into Google’s search results centered
on bias towards Google-owned publisher where evidence is sharpest.
23In the baseline model, display ads are redundant because product search has no imperfections, nor added costs given
participation; see sections 6 and 7 for an extension. Display ads are also harmless because consumers ignore irrelevant or
type 2 display ads, but see 8 on compulsive consumers.
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types tie, we momentarily let rO denote the probability that G sends content searchers to their best-
match publishers, while rS is the probability of sending product searchers to their best-match merchants
– a type 1, relevant merchant. So we have,
Proposition 1 Total surplus maximization requires the search engine to allocate traffic with no distor-
tion from the consumer’s ideal; in the first-best, rO = rS = 1.
This proposition also holds in the constrained scenario where the planner cannot control consumer
behavior (search participation and trade). In fact, the need to attract these consumers, who neglect the
positive externality of their participation on producer surplus, only reinforces the planner’s incentives
to not distort search.
3 Equilibrium analysis under vertical separation
Throughout the paper, we solve for subgame perfect equilibria in undominated strategies. Consumers
make many decisions but most are immediate once stated. As already noted, consumers always click on
the single link after entering either type of query; that is, they follow G’s “recommendation.” Similarly,
consumers only ever buy a product from their category of interest and they never buy more than one unit
overall. In the product search stage, consumers have no subsequent chance to find attractive products,
so they buy the advertised product whether type 1 or type 2, provided it is from the relevant category,
which it is in all equilibria of the baseline model. Anticipating this, in the prior content search stage,
consumers only buy a displayed product if it is type 1 as well as relevant.24 Consumers omit the product
search if a display ad satisfies their demand for products since they only demand one unit, but they
always gain from content search, if they paid their cost of participating in online search. Participation
is the only remaining non-trivial consumer decision and is characterized below.
Search auctions. We begin by studying the optimal design of sponsored search auctions and
merchants’ equilibrium bidding strategies. Consumers who did not purchase oﬄine goods through
display advertising enter their product query in the search engine. Four merchants, two of each type k,
are potentially relevant and correctly anticipate that every click on their search ad leads to a purchase,
so type k’s are willing to pay a PPC of mk to appear in the single slot of G’s sponsored search results;
merchants’ bids have no impact on their alternative sales options. As in unweighted second-price
auctions, each merchant’s unique weakly dominant strategy is to bid her willingness to pay, bk = mk:
Lemma 1 For any µ, rO, rS, the strategy profile (b1, b2) = (m1,m2) is the unique equilibrium.
24A type 2 display ad is less attractive than continuing to a product search which offers some chance of a relevant type
1 product; rSv1 +
(
1− rS) v2 ≥ v2. If rS = 0, consumers would also be willing to buy type 2 products via display ads,
but this cannot occur in equilibrium; the expectation of type 2 display purchases would lead G to set rS slightly above 0
in order to induce type 1 display purchases, thereby raising consumer participation.
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So if µ < m1m2 , type 2 bids are so discounted that a type 1 merchant always wins and traffic is efficiently
allocated. Conversely, if µ > m1m2 , type 2 merchants always win and product search is inefficient.
Discounting type 2 merchants by the precise weight, µ = m1m2 , equates the two types of merchant’s
effective willingness to pay, allowing G to use its tie-breaking rule rS to fine-tune the probability, then
equal to rS , that a type 1 merchant wins the position auction. G need only consider this last case, since
G can always set rS = 1 and 0 to generate outcomes equivalent to higher and lower µ, respectively.
Competition among merchants implies that, in equilibrium, the winner always pays its willingness to
pay. Summarizing:
Lemma 2 G optimally sets auction weight µ = m1m2 , so that a relevant type 1 merchant wins the auction,
paying m1 per click, with G’s chosen probability rS, and a relevant type 2 merchant wins, paying m2
per click, with probability 1 − rS; G’s average revenue equals the average margin, denoted M (rS), on
sponsored-search-mediated sales: M
(
rS
)
= rSm1 +
(
1− rS)m2.
Display auctions. We now turn attention to the second-price auctions for display advertising that
take place whenever a participating consumer lands on a publisher’s webpage, during her first stage
of search, her content search. Merchants compete by bidding their willingness to pay per click. They
anticipate zero rents from any product searches, so merchants have no opportunity cost of winning a
display ad, nor any indirect benefit. Clearly, type 2 merchants cannot gain from bidding for display ads,
given that consumers only ever buy type 1 products in the content stage. The merchants indicated by
the targeting signal – those selling (s (i) , 1) – anticipate that if they win a display ad, a fraction σ of
clicks will yield sales, so they bid σm1, while other type 1 merchants only bid 1−σJ−1m1. The merchants
selling (s (i) , 1) always win, but their sales per click rate, σ, is still strictly below the full unit rate in
search advertising.25 So we have,
Lemma 3 Publishers optimally conduct unweighted auctions and the type 1 merchants indicated as
most relevant by the targeting technology bid σm1 per click and one of them wins.
Recall that a consumer visiting a publisher website is attracted by a display ad with probability α
if visiting her favorite publisher and αβ if visiting any other publisher. So in equilibrium, the average
fraction of clicks on display ads is αe
(
rO
)
, where e
(
rO
)
= rO +
(
1− rO)β and is increasing in rO since
β < 1. A fraction σ of these clicks end up in a transaction, so the fraction, η, of participating consumers
who buy via display advertising (always their best-match product) is given by,
η = σαe
(
rO
)
= σα
(
rO +
(
1− rO)β) .
25Publishers have no incentives to use a weighted auction to allocate their display ad slots, since type 2 merchants never
bid. In any case, publishers would internalize little of the consumer participation benefit from type 1 display ads since N
is usually large.
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Note that η increases with the quality of the targeting technology, σ, and with the reliability of organic
results, rO. Letting X denote consumer participation, the mass of consumers performing a product
search is X (1− η).
Consumer participation and continuation equilibrium. Consumer participation is deter-
mined by the expected benefit from search participation, which we denote by c¯ ; all consumers with a
lower cost ci will participate. So X = F (c), where c¯ is the sum of three expected net utilities from i
consuming, respectively, online content (net value u or 0), her best-match product (net value v1) and
her second-best product (net value v2):
c = rOu+ v1
[
η + (1− η) rS] + v2 (1− η) (1− rS) . (1)
The probability in brackets of finding her best-match product sums the probabilities η via display adver-
tising and (1− η) rS via search advertising, whereas she only ever consumes her second-best product via
search advertising, in the probability (1− η) (1− rS) event that she neglects display ads during content
search and G shows a type 2 merchant. Note that c increases with rO, rS and σ. So if G distorts traffic,
by setting low values of rO and/or rS , it pays the cost of reduced consumer participation. The two
instruments, rO and rS , play a similar role in encouraging participation and a high value of one reduces
the sensitivity of participation to the other; that is ∂
2c
∂rS∂rO
< 0. Drawing all this together, we have:
Proposition 2 In the unique continuation equilibrium following any
(
rO, rS
)
, merchants make zero
profits, each publisher earns Πn =
F (c)
N ηm1, and the search engine earns Π
G = F (c) (1− η)M (rS).
Traffic management. Of the three positive factors constituting G’s profit, rO increases the first
(participation, F (c¯)) and decreases the second (the fraction who product search, 1 − η), while rS
increases the first and decreases the third (the average margin of search-based trades, M
(
rS
)
). So
there is a simple trade-off for organic search: lowering rO shifts trades from display to search platform,
raising 1−η, but increasing rO attracts search participation, F (c¯). Similarly, there is a trade-off between
raising rS to attract participation, and lowering rS to raise the average margin of search-based trades.
Mathematically, the first-order conditions for maximizing G’s profits with respect to rO and rS are:
∂ΠG
∂rO
1
M (rS)
= f (c)
∂c
∂rO
(1− η)− F (c) dη
drO
= 0, (2)
∂ΠG
∂rS
1
1− η = f (c)
∂c
∂rS
M
(
rS
)
+ F (c)
dM
(
rS
)
drS
= 0. (3)
which can be rewritten using the reverse hazard rate H (·) as:
H (c) (1− η)
[
u
σα (1− β) + (v1 − v2)
(
1− rS)] = 1, (4)
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H (c) (1− η)
[
v1 − v2
m2 −m1m1 + (v1 − v2)
(
1− rS)] = 1. (5)
There is no equilibrium at rS = rO = 1 if the left hand side (LHS) of either (4) or (5) is then less than
1. So a sufficient condition for distortions is,
H (u+ v1) (1− σα)m1 min
{
u
σα (1− β)m1 ,
v1 − v2
m2 −m1
}
< 1, (6)
Moreover, since the LHS of both (4) and (5) are decreasing in both rO and rS , this condition is also
necessary, giving:
Proposition 3 The search engine allocates traffic inefficiently, rS < 1 and/or rO < 1, if and only if
condition (6) holds.
G’s choices (rS , rO) generate both vertical and horizontal externalities on publishers, whose aggregate
profits are F (c)σαe
(
rO
)
m1: (i) G has a vertical externality because both rS and rO raise consumer
participation, F (c); (ii) G has a horizontal externality, because rO raises the “effectiveness” of display
advertising, e
(
rO
)
. In other words, G’s policy determines both the mass of consumers engaged in
online search where they demand oﬄine products, and how this demand translates into purchases,
via either display or search advertising. In the limiting case of β = 1 with the baseline assumption
of symmetric publishers, G cannot reduce the effectiveness of display advertising, and G only affects
publishers vertically. But if β < 1, G also affects the degree of substitutability between display and
search advertising. Concretely, G can accomplish business-stealing from publishers’ competing display
ad platforms by distorting organic traffic, because this reduces the effectiveness of publishers’ websites
as advertising outlets. The distortion hurts consumers as well as publishers, even if rS = 1. So, in
contrast to typical horizontal relations where competition is healthy, the horizontal externality results
in lower consumer, and total, welfare.
The minimum expression in (6) is instructive: G has stronger incentives to distort organic search
than to distort sponsored search if uσα(1−β)m1 <
v1−v2
m2−m1 , and conversely if the inequality is reversed.
These two terms represent the respective cost-benefit ratios from marginally distorting organic and
sponsored searches from rS = rO = 1:26 distorting organic search reduces consumer surplus at the
rate u (product trade values are fixed at v1 since rS = 1) while raising G’s ad revenues at the rate
σα (1− β)m1, as search-based trades substitute for display-based trades; meanwhile, distorting instead
sponsored search (reducing rS) reduces consumer surplus at the rate v1 − v2 while raising the value of
G’s sponsored ads at the rate m2−m1, both per product-searching consumer. To have rS and rO both
interior in (0, 1) requires exact equality of their respective cost-benefit ratios, otherwise the first-order
26More generally, for any values of rS and rO, the inequality determines which cost-benefit ratio is larger.
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conditions cannot hold simultaneously. So generically, at most one will be interior and interior solutions
for both variables will obtain when
u
σα (1− β)m1 =
v1 − v2
m2 −m1 . (7)
By contrast, the solution for rO or rS is interior for a set of parameter values with a non-empty interior.27
So we can conduct relevant comparative statics.
Comparative statics and instrument substitutability.
The two instruments, rO and rS , are imperfect substitutes from G’s perspective. Indeed, G’s profit
function satisfies the standard definition of substitutability: ∂
2ΠG
∂rSrO
< 0. As we have seen, in our stark
model, G’s equilibrium strategy is typically to set one of rO or rS at 0 or 1. Marginal changes in
parameter values then induce a change in only one of these instruments. The exception is when the
change in the parameter crosses the threshold defined in (7). That is, when the change in the parameter
induces a change in the relative size of the cost-benefit ratios of organic and sponsored search distortions.
Consider, first the effect of an increase in the accuracy of the targeting technology, σ. Define σ∗ as
the value of this parameter that, given the rest of parameters, makes (7) hold. For values of σ < σ∗,
the left hand side of (4) is larger than the left hand side of (5) so that rS ≤ rO, and for values of σ > σ∗
the opposite is true. Consider the case of interest where the parameter values are such that, for σ close
to σ∗, rS ∈ (0, 1) or rO ∈ (0, 1).28 Note that ΠG is jointly continuous in rS , rO, and σ. Then, from
the maximum theorem, the equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. Also, evaluated at
σ∗, (4) is the same equation as (5), so that there is a continuum of solutions interior for both variables.
Since ∂
2ΠG
∂rSrO
< 0, all these solutions lie on a downward sloping curve in rS , rO space. From upper
hemicontinuity, we then conclude that:
Remark 1 An improvement in the accuracy of the targeting technology so that σ crosses from below to
above σ∗ increases rS and decreases rO.
The result is intuitive. As we discussed above, the two sides of (7) represent the cost-benefit ratio
of distortions in organic and sponsored search, respectively. For the same participation and the same
fraction of trades through display ads, η, the cost-benefit ratio from distorting organic search (left hand
side of (7)) is lower with higher values of σ. This pushes rO down and, consequently, rS up. Thus,
27The LHS of (4) and (5) are continuous functions of parameters and endogenous variables. For instance, if v1−v2
m2−m1 <
u
σα(1−β)m1 and (5) holds at r
S = rO = 1, a small parameter change that decreases the LHS of (5) induces rS to fall strictly
and no change in rO.
28A sufficient condition for rS and/or rO below 1, and rS and/or rO above 0, is that (6) holds and also,
H (v2 + σαβ(v1 − v2)) (1− σαβ)m1
[
max
{
v1 − v2
m2 −m1 ,
u
σα (1− β)m1
}]
> 1.
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when an improvement of targeting technologies makes display advertising a closer substitute for search
advertising, G’s reaction is not only to fight that by reducing traffic to relevant publishers, but also
to substitute organic search distortion for sponsored search distortion. As a result, sponsored search
becomes more reliable.
The strength of the conflict of interest affects G’s choice of policy in a similar way. The simplest way
to see this is by assuming that m1 remains constant, but m2 increases. This time, it is the cost-benefit
ratio from distorting sponsored search that is reduced. Consequently, an increase in m2 from a value
where the right hand side of (7) is larger than the left hand side to a value where the opposite is true,
reduces rS and, consequently, increases rO. That is, the sharper conflict of interest leads to less reliable
sponsored search but more reliable organic search.
However, for a given strength of the conflict of interest, an increase in the profitability of the oﬄine
products market has the opposite effect. In particular, consider an increase in mi with m1 − m2
kept constant, i = 1, 2. As with an increase in σ, this change reduces the cost-benefit ratio from
distorting organic search (left hand side of (7)) without affecting the cost-benefit ratio of sponsored
search distortions. Thus, when the increase in mi crosses the threshold (7), G responds by reducing rO
and, consequently, increasing rS . That is, by reducing the reliability of organic search and increasing
the reliability of sponsored search.
An increase in u, and so in the relative importance of online content for consumers, increases the
cost-benefit ratio of distortions in organic search, and so when the increase in u crosses the threshold
(7), G will respond by improving the reliability of organic search and reducing that of sponsored search.
So far we have focused on G’s incentives to substitute rO for rS or vice versa, which are dominant
when parameter values cross the threshold. When changes in parameter values have no effect on the
ranking of cost-benefit ratios of distortions in organic and sponsored search, G’s incentives to adjust its
reliability come from the impact of parameter values on H (c) (1− η)m1, the common terms in (4) and
(5). For instance, a larger σ implies a larger c and larger η, and so lower H (c) (1− η)m1. That is, when
σ increases without crossing the threshold (7), G responds by reducing reliability of either sponsored
or organic search, rS or rO. By contrast, an increase in mi increases H (c) (1− η)m1. That is, a larger
return per consumer gives G incentives to foster consumer participation, which is achieved by raising
reliability. Similarly, larger u implies greater participation c, and so lower value of H (c), which is an
additional incentive for higher distortions in either sponsored or organic search.
4 The effect of integration with full monopolization
In this section, we examine the effects of integration in the baseline model, beginning with an idealized
scenario that isolates the positive sides of integration. Here and in sections 5 and 6, we study integration
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into ad intermediation, deferring integration into publishing to section 7.
We consider a merger between G and one of the ad intermediaries and we refer to publishers that pay
G’s ad intermediary to run their display advertising as “affiliates” (of G) and the rest as “non-affiliates”
(ofG). Given the absence of regulatory supervision, G can set different values of organic search reliability
for affiliates and non-affiliates. We also need to explicitly describe the actions of intermediaries. So the
baseline model changes in two ways. In the first stage, G now announces
(
µ, rS , rOG, r
O
NG
)
, where rOG
and rONG are the reliability of organic results to affiliated and non-affiliated websites, respectively. In
between the first and second stages of the baseline model, each intermediary simultaneously announces
its tariff T for publisher services, and then publishers respond simultaneously.
G’s ad intermediary can handle an unlimited number of publishers, so it can capture the entire
surplus from display advertising. In equilibrium, all other intermediaries offer T = 0, as was left implicit
in the previous section, and G sets rONG = 0 to extract all publisher rents by charging TG =
F (c)
N ηm1,
which each publisher accepts. In this equilibrium, the average reliability of content search, rO, satisfies
rO = rOG. Nothing changes beyond the transfer of rents to G. G’s profits are now:
29
ΠG = F (c)
[
(1− η)M (rS) + ηm1] .
Relative to non-integration, G’s per-consumer profits rise by the rents ηm1 extracted from publishers.
That is, G now gains from consumer participation through display as well as sponsored search auctions.
So G has stronger incentives to attract consumer participation and this encourages increased reliability
of both organic and sponsored search. In addition, since η increases with rO, G can increase these new
rents by raising the reliability of organic search, which makes display ads more effective. In consequence,
rS and rO both increase weakly, as we now prove in detail. Mathematically, the first-order conditions
for maximizing G’s profits with respect to rO and rS , respectively, shift from conditions (4) and (5) to:
∂ΠG
∂rO
= f (c)
∂c
∂rO
[
(1− η)M (rS) + ηm1]− F (c) dη
drO
[
M
(
rS
)−m1] = 0, (8)
∂ΠG
∂rS
= f (c)
dc
drS
[
(1− η)M (rS) + ηm1] + F (c) (1− η) dM (rS)
drS
= 0. (9)
which can be rewritten as:
H (c)
(1− η)M (rS) + ηm1
M (rS)−m1
[
u
σα (1− β) + (v1 − v2)
(
1− rS)] = 1, (10)
H (c)
[
v1 − v2
m2 −m1m1 + (v1 − v2)
(
1− rS) (1− η)] = 1. (11)
29Here, we assume G cannot influence the type or quantity of display advertising of publishers affiliating with G. See
also sections 7 and 8.
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The LHS is higher for (10) than (11), for (10) than (4) and for (11) than (5), which indicate respectively,
(i) rO ≥ rS with at most one being interior, (ii) given rS , integration encourages more reliable organic
search, and (iii) given rO, integration encourages more reliable sponsored search. In fact, we can show
that interaction between these two instruments does not change these insights. In particular, in the
Appendix we prove:
Proposition 4 Integration with full monopolization improves the reliability of the search engine and
increases both consumer and total surplus; in particular, moving from no integration to full integration
weakly raises rS and rO, and raises one or both strictly, unless initially rS and rO at a corner solution.
Under integration, G monopolizes the display advertising intermediation market and appropriates
all publisher rents, which improves G’s incentives to allocate traffic correctly, from the consumer and
total surplus perspectives, for both types of queries. G internalizes both the vertical and horizontal
externalities discussed above. The incentives to distort organic search are lower because the business-
stealing effect disappears – G internalizes the horizontal externality. In addition, G takes into account
the effect of higher consumer participation on publishers’ rents – G internalizes the vertical externality
from attracting consumers with higher reliability of both organic and sponsored search.30
This proposition ignores the distributional consequences of vertical integration. In particular, pub-
lishers get zero profits which would, in a model with costly content, affect the quality of online content.
Another potential drawback of integration lies in G’s incentives to discriminate against publishers that
do not deal with G’s ad intermediaries or are otherwise less productive for G. This effect is absent in
the above, extreme case of full monopolization where publishers are symmetric and all deal with G in
equilibrium. In the next two sections, we illustrate how discrimination comes into play in a less extreme
market structure.
5 Integration with partial monopolization
The assumptions in our baseline model, in particular constant returns to scale in ad intermediation and
the absence of regulation, result in full monopolization when G enters the ad intermediation market.
That is, in equilibrium, all publishers affiliate with G’s ad intermediary. So G’s policy of discriminating
against the publishers not dealing with G’s ad intermediary did not translate into any actual discrimi-
nation among publishers in equilibrium. In a more realistic setting, publishers would be heterogeneous
and G’s integration with one ad intermediary would typically result in partial monopolization. So in
this section, we start examining the consequences of partial monopolization of the display advertising
30The only remaining incentive to distort organic search derives from the fact that the integrated entity gets higher
per consumer profits via search than via display ads – M
(
rS
) ≥ m1; cf., section 7. As with non-integration, improved
targeting technologies increase remaining incentives to distort traffic.
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market. Rather than model the exact obstacles that prevent full monopolization, we suppose that G’s
ad intermediary can handle the advertising business of at most a fraction γ of publishers.31
As in the previous section, we let G treat affiliated and non-affiliated websites differently, by setting
rOG and r
O
NG, and again, G offers ad intermediation in exchange for a tariff, TG, seeking to attract the
maximal feasible fraction, γ, of publishers. We assume consumers do not know whether their favorite
publisher will be affiliated with G when they decide on participation.
Clearly, G will find it optimal to send any diverted traffic to a publisher in the G network of
affiliates.32 So extending the effective visit notation, e
(
rO
)
, from previous sections, by letting eG and
eNG denote the average aggregate “effectiveness” of visits to publishers inside and outside the G network,
respectively, we have,
eG
(
rOG, r
O
NG
)
= rOG +
(
1− rOG
)
β +
1− γ
γ
(
1− rONG
)
β,
eNG
(
rONG
)
= rONG,
assuming that indeed the fraction γ of publishers accept G’s offer. The fraction of trades occurring on
G’s affiliated and non-affiliated publishers is then ηG = σαeG and ηNG = σαeNG, respectively, so the
overall fraction of trades occurring via display advertising, η, is given by:
η = γηG + (1− γ)ηNG = σα (γeG + (1− γ) eNG) ,
while the average accuracy of organic search results, rO, is:
rO = γrOG + (1− γ)rONG.
Participation is still determined by (1) using these averages. Lemma 3 still holds, both for publishers
affiliated with G and for the non-affiliated: type 1 merchants still bid a PPC of σm1 in both types of
publishers’ auctions. It only remains to determine how G sets TG in the continuation game: G’s optimal
choice is a tariff equal to a publisher’s willingness to pay to be part of the G network. Expecting a
fraction γ to affiliate with G, this value is:
TG =
F (c)
N
(ηG − ηNG)m1.
G’s expected profits from these affiliated publishers sum to γNTG, giving overall expected profits:
ΠG = F (c)
[
(1− η)M (rS) + (η − ηNG)m1] ,
31One possible interpretation of this exogenous constraint is that an increase in G’s market share above γ might trigger
an unwanted investigation by the regulatory agency.
32Distorting search for online goods away from the best-match publisher has the same effect on customer participation
and merchants’ willingness to pay for sponsored ads regardless of whether the destination publisher is affiliated with G;
in equilibrium, all publishers have the same quantity and type of display ads. Thus, the destination of diverted traffic
is irrelevant from the cost point of view, but not from the benefit point of view: G can charge its affiliated publishers a
higher tariff if it sends them all the additional traffic diverted from non-affiliated sites.
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where we use the fact that ηG − ηNG = η−ηNGγ . The effects of rOG and rS on G’s profits are analogous
to those discussed in the case of full monopolization, equations (8) and (9).
In equilibrium, all publishers earn a rent equal to what they could get by refusing G’s offer. So
publishers jointly appropriate ηNGm1 = rONGασm1. Clearly, r
O
NG increases this publisher surplus. In
addition, for any rS < 1, since M
(
rS
)
> m1, r
O
NG reduces the total producer surplus, by increasing the
share η of display-mediated trades (that generates a margin m1), and reduce search-mediated trades
(with average margin, M
(
rS
)
). Since G appropriates the producer minus the publisher surplus, G has
an incentive to reduce rONG for both these reasons. In the full monopolization case, G always minimizes
rONG at zero to extract all publisher rent. However, consumer participation is now increasing in r
O
NG,
because organic distortions affecting non-affiliated publishers now affect a non-zero fraction, 1 − γ, of
consumers in equilibrium. This moderates G’s incentives to reduce rONG and the optimal r
O
NG may
be positive, but for exactly the same reason, any such distortions (rONG < 1) now impose equilibrium
inefficiency: they reduce consumer and social surplus. We now demonstrate how these harms can
dominate the positive side of integration so that partial integration decreases overall social surplus,
relative to non-integration.
As just explained, the main distinctive feature of partial integration is reflected in the first-order
condition with respect to rONG:
33
∂ΠG
∂rONG
= f (c)
∂c
∂rONG
ΠG
F (c)
− F (c) ∂η
∂rONG
[
M
(
rS
)−m1]− F (c) ∂ηNG
∂rONG
m1. (12)
To emphasize the role of the fraction of affiliated publishers, γ, we rewrite this as:
∂ΠG
∂rONG
1
(1− β)σα = (1− γ)Ψ
(
rOG, r
O
NG, r
S
)− F (c) m1
1− β , (13)
where we embed the first and second effects in Ψ
(
rOG, r
O
NG, r
S
)
defined by:
Ψ
(
rOG, r
O
NG, r
S
)
= f (c)
(
u
(1− β)σα + (v1 − v2)
(
1− rS)) ΠG
F (c)
− F (c) [M (rS)−m1] .
As γ increases towards 1, since Ψ converges to a finite number, the first term of (13) converges to 0, but
the second remains strictly negative in the limit. So for sufficiently large γ, G has incentives to distort
traffic to non-affiliates.
As with full monopolization, partial integration leads G to internalize the horizontal and vertical
externalities on the affiliated publishers. The vertical internalization is partial, because publishers retain
some rents if rONG > 0. The horizontal internalization is also partial, because it only applies to affiliated
publishers. Nonetheless, these effects promote reliable search results for sponsored search and organic
33The three terms correspond to the three effects just described, now in inverse order: raising rONG raises participation,
lowers producer surplus and raises publisher surplus.
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searches where an affiliate publisher is relevant; that is, rOG, r
S are higher. At the same time, partial
integration exacerbates G’s incentives to steal business from non-affiliated publishers, because distorting
organic searches that should be directed to non-affiliated publishers not only substitutes search-mediated
trades for display-mediated trades (as occurred with non-integration) but also transfers the remaining
display-mediated trades from non-affiliated to affiliated publishers. This exacerbated business-stealing
can make consumers worse off under partial than non-integration. For a simple illustration, suppose
condition (6) is broken so that G sets rO = rS = 1 under non-integration. As just explained above,
under partial integration with γ sufficiently close to 1, G sets rONG < 1. Both consumer and total surplus
are then lower than under non-integration. Summarizing:
Proposition 5 There exists a region of parameter values for which vertical integration with partial
monopolization reduces both consumer and total surplus.
The illustration identifies the converse of (6) and γ close to 1 as sufficient conditions for integration to
cause a welfare reduction. This might suggest relatively small welfare losses, given that only a fraction,
1 − γ, of publishers face distortion. However, in the Appendix, we show that γ can be arbitrarily low
and the consumer and total surplus losses occasioned by integration can be substantial.
6 Asymmetric publishers
In this section, we analyze how differences in publishers’ effectiveness for display advertising affect search
bias incentives and welfare outcomes. It is important to also allow for imperfections in the product search
channel for oﬄine trade. Otherwise, as shown above in the baseline model, publisher asymmetries are
irrelevant to an integrated monopolist, because display advertising is redundant, exactly as in the first-
best. As already noted, that redundancy was an artifact of the assumption of frictionless product search.
Introducing product search imperfections gives the integrated monopolist a natural motive to distort
organic search to raise the effectiveness of display advertising. While the baseline model only allowed for
distortions that reduced display effectiveness (via β < 1), publisher heterogeneity in display effectiveness
now makes display-enhancing distortions feasible too. We demonstrate that this new distortion incentive
can make integrated monopoly worse for consumers and social welfare than non-integration.
We model heterogeneity in publisher ad effectiveness in the simplest possible way: a proportion ρ of
publishers are type H, characterized by a higher baseline ad effectiveness αH than the rest, which are
type L and have effectiveness αL < αH . We denote α = ραH + (1 − ρ)αL. We assume αL < βαH to
focus on the interesting, high asymmetry case where display advertising is always less effective on type L
than type H publishers, even comparing best-match visitors on the type L publishers with worst-match
visitors on type H publishers. To introduce imperfection in product search, we now assume that, while
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a proportion φ of participating consumers behave as in the baseline model, always able to search for
products at no added cost after searching for content, the remaining proportion, 1−φ, can only conduct
a content search. Publishers, intermediaries, merchants, and the search engine know this, but do not
know which individual consumers have a viable option of product search. Consumers, by contrast, learn
whether they can do a product search after choosing to participate and before responding to display
ads during content search.34 Notice that during their content search, a fraction 1− φ of consumers are
now willing to buy when faced with a display ad of the relevant type 2 product. But the other fraction
φ would still wait to conduct a product search, so if φ is reasonably large, type 1 merchants still outbid
type 2 merchants when competing for display ads. We assume m1 > (1− φ)m2, to indeed ensure that
display ads are all of type 1 products, as in the preceding analysis.35
G may gain by treating asymmetric publishers asymmetrically. So we distinguish the reliability of
content search by whether the consumer is looking for a type H or type L publisher, denoting by rOH and
rOL , respectively. Moreover, G can choose to divert customers to either of the two types of publishers,
so we let da,b represent the fraction of traffic diverted from type a publishers that is directed to type b
publishers, for a, b ∈ {L,H}; of course, daH + daL = 1 for each a ∈ {L,H}. Now η becomes,
η = σρ
[
rOHαH + (1− rOH)β (dHLαL + (1− dHL)αH)
]
(14)
+ σ(1− ρ) [rOLαL + (1− rOL )β (dLHαH + (1− dLH)αL)] .
The average reliability of content search is rO = ρrOH + (1− ρ)rOL , and participation is now given by,
c = rOu+ ηv1 + φ (1− η)
(
v1r
S + v2
(
1− rS)) .
We begin with the case of non-integration. G’s profits are,
ΠG = φF (c) (1− η)M (rS) .
For a given level of sponsored search reliability rS , if one can fix the fraction of display-mediated trades,
η, G’s profits are increasing in rO since this raises participation c without changing G’s profit per
consumer. Since η is increasing in rOH and decreasing in dHL, if these two values are interior, one can
raise dHL and rOH such that η remains unchanged but r
O indeed increases. Thus:
Lemma 4 Under non-integration, if rOH < 1, then dHL = 1.
34One interpretation is that, after deciding to participate, a fraction φ of consumers will discover a product need and
form a plan to search for and buy it, but the other fraction, 1− φ, are unaware of their latent product demand and only
consider buying oﬄine products if exposed to an ad.
35This inequality is unnecessary if consumers always discover how to conduct a product search upon seeing a display
ad of the relevant product, of either type.
23
The intuition is simple. Under separation, G benefits from reducing oﬄine trade mediated through
publisher display ads, but wants to let consumers consume their preferred content as far as possible.
Distorting traffic from type H to type L publishers maximizes the reduction in display-mediated trade
for a given reduction in the reliability of content search.
To evaluate the possibility of a non-distorted equilibrium, we suppose rOL = r
S = 1 and focus on the
incentives over rOH . In this case, r
O = ρrOH +(1−ρ). Considering the first-order conditions for G’s profit
maximization evaluated at rS = rOH = 1 and η = σα, we can write the conditions for an equilibrium
with no distortions as:
H (c) (1− σα)
(
u
σ [αL − β (dLHαH + (1− dLH)αL)] + v1(1− φ)
)
≥ 1,
H (c) (1− σα)
(
u
σ (αH − βαL) + v1(1− φ)
)
≥ 1, (15)
φH (c) (1− σα) v1 − v2
m2 −m1m1 ≥ 1, (16)
where c = u + (σα(1− φ) + φ) v1. The first inequality is implied by the second. Note that for φ = 1
and αH = αL, this replicates the conditions in section 3. As in that section, these conditions are also
sufficient; the LHS of both (15) and (16) are decreasing both in rS and in rOH .
We now turn to the case of integration where G monopolizes the ad intermediation market. As
in section 5, we seek to demonstrate parameter values for which G will distort under integration with
full monopolization, but not under separation. So suppose that G sets rS = 1 = rOH . In this case,
rO = ρ+ (1− ρ)rOL , c = rOu+ φv1 + η(1− φ)v1 and
ΠG = m1F (c) [φ+ η(1− φ)] .
Clearly, ΠG is now increasing in η as well as c, which is itself increasing in η, for any given value of
rO. (G has no cost from increasing η when integrated, given G’s search ads are selling type 1 products
just like the display ads.) It follows immediately that dLH = 1 is optimal since dLH increases η. Since
∂η
∂rOL
= σ(1 − ρ) (αL − βαH) is negative by our assumption of substantial publisher heterogeneity, G
now has a motive to decrease rOL , diverting search to more ad-effective publishers.
36 Of course, there
is a trade-off, because search accuracy raises participation. These effects are captured in the first-order
derivative which we evaluate at rOL = 1,
∂ΠG
∂rOL
1
m1
= f (c)
∂c
∂rOL
[φ+ η(1− φ)] + F (c) ∂η
∂rOL
(1− φ), (17)
36These distortions by the fully integrated G are akin to a monopoly media outlet distorting by picking news content
that makes the media outlet’s display ads more effective (see Ellman and Germano, 2009).
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Notice that if φ = 1, the second term representing the increase in display effectiveness is nullified since
display is redundant, as explained earlier.37 Now a sufficient condition for the existence of distortions
under vertical integration is that,
H (c)
σα+ φ(1− σα)
1− φ
(
u
σ (βαH − αL) − v1(1− φ)
)
< 1, (18)
evaluated at c = u+(σα+ φ(1− σα)) v1 as in (15) and (16). It is a simple exercise to see that condition
(18) is compatible with (15) and (16), and so integration may lead to an increase in distortions in
organic search. This increased distortion necessarily reduces both consumer and total surplus when
u > (m1 + v1) (1− φ)σ (βαH − αL). A consumer interested in an L type publisher may be attracted
by a display ad with higher probability if sent to an H type publisher. The probability increase
is σ (βαH − αL), and with probability 1 − φ, this is the consumer’s only chance for consuming an
oﬄine product. However, given the inequality, this potential gain in surplus does not compensate the
consumer’s direct utility loss from not consuming her preferred online content. This sufficient condition
for distortions to result in consumer and total surplus losses is also compatible with (18), (15), and
(16).38 Thus, we conclude,
Proposition 6 With asymmetric publishers integration with full monopolization can reduce consumer
and total surplus.
As in the case of symmetric publishers, integration with full monopolization induces G to internalize
the vertical and horizontal externalities imposed on publishers. The difference is that G’s internalization
of the vertical externality may no longer be in the interest of consumers. Indeed, under the assumptions
of this section, aggregate publisher revenue is larger if traffic is distorted from publishers with low to
high ad effectiveness. Moreover, an integrated G cares about this display ad revenue, which is not
redundant given the friction, φ < 1, in product search and search-mediated advertising. So G has a new
incentive to distort traffic, this time from less to more ad-effective publishers.
We could have also considered the case where G only deals with type H publishers, perhaps because
it cannot price-discriminate among publishers and prefers to set a tariff too high for type L publishers
37As is already implicit, publisher asymmetry is also crucial: the key factor in the display ad effectiveness derivative,
αL − βαH , is obviously negative if αL = αH . The distortion arises because with φ < 1, display is not redundant and
publisher asymmetry gives G an instrument that increases η: G can direct consumers whose preferred publisher is type
L to a type H publisher. With symmetry, the effect of rO on ΠG, for φ = 1 represented by (8), is always positive if
rS = 1. Introducing φ < 1 to the symmetric case, ∂Π
G
∂rO
is given by (17) with rO substituting for rOL . Since participation
and profits per consumer would then both increase with η and participation and η would still increase in rO, ∂Π
G
∂rO
would
still be positive.
38For u = (m1 + v1) (1− φ)σ (βαH − αL) and β = 1, the parenthesis in (18) takes the value m1 (1− φ), and the
parenthesis in (15) takes the value (2v1 +m1) (1− φ). So for v1 sufficiently large, the left hand side of (18) is smaller than
the left hand side of (15), and the value of H(c) can be adjusted so that the two expressions lie on the corresponding sides
of 1. Finally, a small enough value of m2 −m1 guarantees that (16) holds.
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to accept. In this case, both the incentives to distort traffic away from non-affiliates and away from
low ad-effective publishers would coincide. The partial internalization of both vertical and horizontal
externalities would then combine against the interest of consumers, reinforcing the possibility that
integration lowers consumer and total surplus.
7 Integration with publishers
So far, we have considered integration of the search engine with an intermediary from the display
advertising market. Integration with publishers results in similar incentives for G. Indeed, if the
integrated entity did not modify how it handled display advertising, sections 4 and 5 would continue
to describe the effects of integration on G’s policies. However, integration with publishers may have
slightly different consequences, since this integration is likely to facilitate manipulation of the supply
of advertising and the coordination of pricing strategies. In fact, there is no role for price coordination
in our stylized model, since prices already extracted all merchant rents under non-integration. But by
manipulating the supply of different types of advertising, an integrated entity might raise its profits
beyond our section 4 and 5 predictions. To show this, we first consider the simplest and extreme case,
where the search engine owns all publishers, but has them set display advertising as in section 4. For
the parameter values that gave rS = 0 and rO < 1 in section 4, this would imply the profits derived
there as,
ΠG = H (c) [(1− η)m2 + ηm1] ,
with c = rOu + ηv1 + (1− η) v2. The reason for distorting rO was that display ads, being of type 1,
restricted G’s ability to maximize type 2 oﬄine trades; the combined entity distorted organic results to
transfer advertiser attention to its search platform where it could better exploit that attention. However,
now the integrated entity could simply choose to eliminate display advertising from publishers’ websites,
inducing all consumers to conduct product searches and removing the motive for distorting organic
search. G would then set rO = 1 and could replicate its previous level of per-consumer profits from
display and search ads by setting rS equal to the prior level of η, which also replicates consumers’
oﬄine trade distribution. Since the increase in rO raises consumer participation, the integrated entity
gains strictly by removing display advertising. Alternatively, it could restrict display advertising to
high margin, that is type 2 merchants, and again adjust its results strategies as just described. In the
baseline setting, this is equivalent, since no one buys via type 2 display ads given any rS > 0. But in
the model with φ < 1, the alternative of restricting a fraction of display advertising to type 2 merchants
is strictly preferable to shutting down display ads, because the display ad channel is not redundant for
the fraction 1− φ of participating consumers who cannot be reached by search advertising.39
39In either case, with full integration into publishing, G would have no incentive to distort organic search.
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Similarly, when the search engine owns a fraction γ of publishers and G’s publishers maintain their
display ads, then borrowing from section 5, there is a region of parameter values such that rOG < 1 and
rS = 0. A more profitable policy includes blocking type 1 display advertising in their own publishers,
setting rOG = 1, leaving r
O
NG fixed, and setting r
S = γηG1−(1−γ)ηNG . With this policy, the integrated entity
makes the same profits per consumer and induces higher consumer participation. Again, simply shutting
down display ads is an optimal strategy if φ = 1, but more generally, G would only want to restrict
against low margin display ads. Summarizing,
Proposition 7 Integration with publishers has essentially the same effects as integration into ad in-
termediation but may differ by reducing the supply of display advertising or restricting display to high
margin products.
This minor difference would disappear if a G owned ad intermediary were also able to exert influence
over display advertising. For instance, G might exert influence by committing to divert traffic away from
those publishers that refuse to adjust the quantity and content of their display ads to G’s request.40
8 Discussion
The model presented in this paper is stylized and parsimonious given its multiple objectives. In section
2, we explained and motivated our main modeling choices. Here, we consider additional extensions.
Compulsive consumers. In the baseline model, the role of advertising is purely informative:
consumers are fully rational and advertising merely enables consumers to locate merchants – advertising
neither persuades nor tempts people to consume, nor does it complement consumption. This is the most
common view of advertising in economic models and Blake et al., (2013) provide supportive evidence for
this view in the case of search advertising. But we now consider the possibility that display advertising is
persuasive as well as informative. This opens the door to more negative views of the welfare implications
of advertising. The analysis readily extends, with few changes.
Concretely, suppose consumers are compulsive and always consume either type of relevant product
when tempted by a display ad. In this scenario, type 2 instead of type 1 merchants buy all the display
ad slots, but the main trade-offs for G are very similar. The novelty is that type 2 display ads lead
compulsive consumers to go against their better interest, so that c¯ is now decreasing in ασ.41 In this case,
40Notice that an analogy of the endogenous affiliation process described for a G ad intermediary in section 4 could, in
principle, lead G to monopolize the market for publishing, diverting traffic away from publishers that reject a G buyout.
However, this seems less plausible than the, already extreme, case of a monopolizing intermediary. First, unlike ownership
transfers, ad contracts are regularly renewed, which facilitates repeated game effects. Second, publishers are more visible
to consumers and plurality of ownership is recognized by regulators as a fundamental value in the media context.
41Given this, compulsives might actually prefer organic search to be distorted, in which case G would distort organic
search fully: there would be no participation/profit trade-off. But a tradeoff remains whenever consumers still prefer
undistorted search, which holds if u > (v1 − v2)σα (1− β).
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the qualitative trade-offs for search distortions are essentially the same as with rational, self-controlled
consumers. Inducing participation is somewhat more difficult, since consumers anticipate suffering from
the temptation of type 2 display ads, but for the same reason, distorting organic search has a lower
participation cost.
Alternatives to auctions and non-necessity of the perfect competition assumption. The
second-price auction is equivalent to a mechanism where G simply sets take-it-or-leave-it offers to type
1 and type 2 merchants with probabilities rS and 1 − rS , respectively. Notice that this posted-price
alternative works equally well in the absence of competition between merchants of each product.42 So
this competition is not essential for our results.43 Similarly, the display-ad auctions could be replaced
by posted-prices.44 Also, in our setup, if G sets a stochastic µ satisfying µ > m1m2 with probability r
S
and otherwise µ < m1m2 , the outcome is the same and G’s optimal strategy is unaffected.
45
Merchant heterogeneity in CTR or CR. The parameter α might also vary by merchant. We
abstracted from such asymmetries, but they are analogous to variations in click-through rates, CTR,
(the probability a consumer clicks on a merchant’s link) and conversion rates, CR, (probability that
consumers arriving at a merchant webpage then buy) as studied by Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen
and He (2011). As discussed above, these studies are essentially compatible with ours. In our model
of product search, both CTR and CR equal unity for any relevant product and only the product of
CTR and CR is relevant. More generally, search engines claim to take account of these factors in
weighting sponsorship bids. In particular, Google was the first to introduce click-weighted auctions in
2003, successfully reducing the prevalence of ads with low CTR, such as mobile phone ringtone and
porn-site ads. We could extend our model along the lines of the aforementioned papers. Advantageous
self-selection, as obtained in these papers, means no added conflict of interest, at least for the case with
a single sponsored link.46
PPC versus price per impression, PPI. Throughout the paper, we assumed sale of ad space
based on price per click, PPC. The CTR for sponsored links and also for display ads, conditional on
42Also all these designs for selling advertising are optimal in our setting as they extract full merchant rent.
43Of course, bias in sponsored search requires two types of merchant to be interested in a common search query.
44As noted just prior to Lemma 3, publishers optimally forego the possibility of weighting bids in the display ad auction
because merchants and publishers have a common interest when consumers buy only type 1 products through display
ads. With compulsive consumers, publishers’ and merchants’ preferences would also be aligned if publishers are numerous
enough that each publisher’s display ad strategy has a negligible impact on consumer participation.
45Auctions are typically better instruments than posted prices when G faces uncertainty about the merchants’ margins.
Note that, if the distribution of these margins is atomless, then tie-breaking is irrelevant. The weight µ would still
determine a probability rS that a type 1 merchant wins the sponsored position.
46Concretely, suppose each consumer only values one of the two merchants offering each product and can costlessly
learn where a sponsored link leads, by observing a snippet. If we further characterize these two merchants by different
probabilities of being the desired seller, this determines and equals that merchant’s CTR. In the one slot setting, there
would be no conflict of interest over this dimension, with both consumers and G favoring the highest CTR. Assuming G
observes the CTR, G would weight the merchant bids by CTR since merchants with low CTR and high expected value per
click would otherwise win too often in a PPC auction. Consumers would benefit. This would be similar to the modeling
approach of Athey and Ellison (2011) who provide a number of interesting further results.
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attracting consumer attention, are equal to one. In general, a lower CTR value would simply scale down
the merchant’s willingness to pay for sponsored positions and display ads under PPI bidding; meanwhile
bidding on PPC is not affected by CTR in our setup. This modeling difference would not affect our
analysis (the distinction matters in richer environments such as that described under heterogeneity).
PPC is slightly simpler to explain and more realistic.
The substitutability of search and display ads. Our framework assumes that both search
and display advertising are purely informative. This implies that merchants view search and display
ads as partial substitutes, which is critical to the organic search distortion results when publishers and
ad intermediaries are symmetric. As discussed for compulsive consumers, the evidence in Blake et
al., (2013) suggesting informative search advertising may not apply for display. More generally, there
may be some persuasive brand advertising on the internet. If both display and search advertising were
persuasive in a similar way, then even if advertisers wished to reach consumers multiple times, decreasing
returns could generate substitutability. But in principle, some merchants may specialize into using just
one advertising channel and they might separate complementary branches of their advertising strategy
between the search and display advertising channels.47 So long as this extreme separation is not the
norm, search and display advertising will be substitutes from the perspective of merchants.
Empirical evidence is limited. An important, related study by Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) used
a natural experiment based on “ambulance-chaser” laws restricting postal advertising by law firms to
show that law firms do consider oﬄine and online advertising to be substitutes. Hahn and Singer (2008)
provide a survey that points to substitutability of the display and search advertising channels. The FTC
(2007) took the controversial view that the markets are essentially independent,48 but the EU (2008)
antitrust authority notes a trend towards substitutability for advertisers in large part as the technologies
used for search and display advertising were, and are becoming increasingly, similar (see point 52 of
EU, 2008).49 In particular, the EU (2008) found that some survey respondents considered search and
display ads to differ only in terms of the “triggering mechanism” which we call targeting. Our model
demonstrates formally how targeting of display ads raises substitutability.
Endogenous entry. Search distortions hinge on the assumption that search engine competition is
ineffective (as justified by network effects in the models of Argenton and PrÂÿfer, 2012, and Etro, 2012).
If instead this competition were effective, consumers could choose to use whichever engine managed to
47If e.g., display ads complement search ads, G would wish to encourage display advertising with or without integration;
this would push in the direction of removing organic search distortions in our baseline case, and induce distortions towards
high α publishers in the extension of section 6.
48Ratliff and Rubinfeld (2010) question the FTC (2007) claims, citing market research studies that suggest that search
and display advertising are increasingly used for similar types of marketing; initially display ads may have been used more
often for building brand awareness while search ads were arguably preferred for direct-response online sales.
49The legal debates surrounding Google reported there are multi-faceted and many extend beyond the scope of our
paper; see van Loon (2012) for a legal discussion.
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build a reputation for reliability.
Endogenous entry of publishers would generate new incentives for G. Consumer and publisher entry
would mutually reinforce, since consumers would then have access to a broader range of online content.
Hence, under separation, G would tend to be more reliable in organic search in order to foster content
variety and so consumer participation. For the same reason, if G fully monopolizes ad intermediation,
G may wish to commit to a relatively low charge for ad intermediation.
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we constructed a model that explicitly describes the workings of markets underlying both
search and display advertising. The two modes of advertising are imperfect substitutes for merchants.
A monopoly search engine mediates between consumers and merchants by addressing consumers to
merchants through search advertising, but content providers present an alternative, competing channel
by which merchants can also reach consumers. So, in the market for oﬄine products, content providers
and the search engine are competitors. What makes the relationship between content providers and the
engine unusual and complicated is the fact that the engine also mediates a related market, that for online
content, where content providers meet consumers. We have shown how, in consequence, a monopoly
search engine has incentives to distort organic search to make display advertising less effective, thereby
increasing the value of sponsored search. At the same time, the search engine has incentives to distort
sponsored search in favor of merchants with high margins. We have characterized how these incentives
interact and how they depend on market characteristics, such as the power of targeting technologies.
We have also investigated the effects of integration. We showed how a monopolist in the search
engine market may monopolize the entire advertising market by buying a single intermediary in the
display advertising market.50 With symmetric publishers, such integration reduces incentives to distort
organic search, as well as sponsored search. However, when the engine integrates with, or affiliates, a
fraction of publishers, new motives to distort organic search results emerge. Partial integration reinforces
the engine’s incentives to steal business from independent publishers, diverting traffic to affiliated or
owned publishers. In fact, this effect may outweigh the positive effect of internalizing the rents from
affiliated or owned publishers and result in lower consumer and total welfare.
Full integration does avoid the engine’s incentive to divert traffic away from independent publishers,
in that none remain, but when publishers’ websites vary in their effectiveness as ad platforms, inter-
nalizing externalities among publishers creates new motives for distortion. Under full integration, the
engine has an incentive to divert traffic from less to more effective publishers to increase the aggregate
50Consistent with this, since buying DoubleClick in 2007 and AdMob in 2009 and Admeld in 2011, Google has overtaken
Yahoo in the market for display advertising which was Yahoo’s remaining strong point; see Learmonth (2011).
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value of display advertising. Again, this new, negative effect may dominate the positive effects of rent
internalization, so that integration results in lower consumer and total surplus.
Ultimately, predicting which of these competing effects will dominate is an empirical question. As
explained above, our model provides a framework for estimating the degree of substitutability between
display and search advertising. Substitutability plays an important role in determining the risk of organic
search bias. We have conducted comparative statics exercises with respect to several parameters that
affect this substitutability: targeting quality by publishers, the relative profitability of oﬄine product
markets, and the conflict of interest between merchants and consumers in that market.
Some relevant issues that we have not analyzed in this paper are amenable for analysis along the
lines of our model. For instance, if consumers’ utility from online content depends on costly publisher
investments, then it seems straightforward that the reduction in publisher revenues associated with
integration of the monopoly search engine into ad intermediation would lead to lower levels of investment
with negative consequences for consumer and total surplus. Given the value of informative, entertaining,
social and educational web content, explicit consideration of this new channel merits attention. Also, the
integration of the search engine with ad intermediaries or publishers may facilitate behavioral targeting
where publishers use a consumers’ past search queries to target display ads more effectively. If so,
integration will increase heterogeneity of ad effectiveness between an engine’s affiliated and non-affiliated
publishers, as well as increase average display ad effectiveness. Simple extensions of our model could be
used to evaluate the entry, reliability and welfare consequences of these additional effects.
10 APPENDIX
10.1 Proof of Proposition 4
The first-order conditions with respect to rO and rS can respectively be written as:
H (c)
(1− η)M (rS) + ηδm1
M (rS)− δm1
[
u
σα (1− β) + (v1 − v2)
(
1− rS)] R 1, (19)
H (c)
v1 − v2
m2 −m1
[
(1− η)M (rS) + ηδm1] R 1, (20)
where δ = 0 for the case with no integration and δ = 1 for the case with integration. Note that for both
equations, the LHS is higher when δ = 1 than when δ = 0. Also when δ = 1, the LHS of (19) is higher
than for (20) even if u = 0.
Suppose that under no integration rS = rO = 1. That requires that the LHS of both equations (19)
and (20) are higher than 1 when evaluated at δ = 0 and rS = rO = 1. So, they are also higher than
1 at rS = rO = 1 when δ = 1. Consequently, rS = rO = 1 is a candidate solution under integration.
In fact, it is the only candidate. In any other alternative, either rS or both rS and rO are lower than
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one, and this is inconsistent with the fact that the LHS of (20) is decreasing in both rS and rO. So the
solution is unchanged.
Suppose that 0 < rS < 1 and rO = 1 under no integration. Then (20) holds with equality for δ = 0.
If under integration, rO < 1 then rS = 0, since the LHS of (19) is higher than for (20). But again, this is
inconsistent with the fact that the LHS of (20) decreases with rS and rO. So rO = 1 under integration.
So rO is unchanged, which, given that the LHS of (20) is higher with δ = 1 than with δ = 0, implies rS
must be higher than under no integration.
Suppose that rS = 0 and 0 < rO < 1 under no integration. If under integration rS > 0, then once
again rO = 1. Instead if rS remains at 0 under integration, then since the LHS of (19) under δ = 1 is
higher than under δ = 0, rO must be higher than under no integration.
Suppose that rS = 0 and rO = 1 under no integration. Similar to the last case, rS either rises with
rO staying at 1, or rS remains at 0, only now with rO remaining at 1.
Finally, suppose that rS = rO = 0 under no integration. This policy could remain optimal under
integration, but not if the LHS of (19) evaluated at δ = 1 and rS = rO = 0 is higher than 1, i.e., if
H (v2)
m2
m2 −m1
[
u
σα (1− β) + (v1 − v2)
]
> 1 (21)
because rO is then necessarily positive under integration. So (21) is a sufficient condition to rule out
the possibility that rS = rO = 0 remains an optimal policy. Since the LHS of (6) is higher than the
LHS of (21), this proves that there exists a non-empty set of parameter values defined by conditions (6)
and (21), for which integration strictly improves the reliability of the search engine in terms of one or
both types of search.
10.2 The size of γ and potential welfare losses from partial integration
Suppose that under no integration rS = rO = 1. Hence,
H (u+ v1) (1− σα) min
{
u
σα (1− β) ,
v1 − v2
m2 −m1m1
}
≥ 1.
Under partial integration, we study the derivative of ΠG with respect to rONG expressed in equation (13).
Evaluating at rS = rOG = r
O
NG = 1, the derivative will be negative (and r
O
NG distorted) if and only if:
(1− γ)H (u+ v1) u (1− σα)
σα
< 1. (22)
We consider two extreme cases. First, suppose that σα is very small. Then, condition (22) will hold
only if γ is very close to 1. In this case, the loss associated with the distortion of traffic to non-affiliated
publishers will be small since the fraction of non-affiliated publishers is also small. Next, suppose that
u
σα(1−β) <
v1−v2
m2−m1m1 and H (u+ v1) (1− σα) uσα(1−β) is very close to 1. Then, under non-integration G
is close to indifferent between setting rO = 1 and a value slightly below. In this case, any value of γ > β
will satisfy (22), so that, unless 1− β is very small, the impact of traffic distortion can be substantial.
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